Taxing capital income: a bad idea by Andrew Atkeson et al.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review
Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 3–17
Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea
Andrew Atkeson V. V. Chari Patrick J. Kehoe
Economist Adviser Monetary Adviser
Research Department Research Department Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank Federal Reserve Bank Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis of Minneapolis of Minneapolis
and Associate Professor and Professor and Chair and Professor
Department of Economics Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of Minnesota University of Minnesota University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Under a narrow set of assumptions, Chamley (1986) established that the
optimal tax rate on capital income is eventually zero. This study examines and
extends that result by relaxing Chamley’s assumptions, one by one, to see if the
result still holds. It does. This study uniﬁes the work of other researchers, who
have conﬁrmed the result independently using different types of models and ap-
proaches. This study uses just one type of model (discrete time) and just one
approach (primal). Chamley’s result holds when agents are heterogeneous rather
than identical, the economy’s growth rate is endogenous rather than exogenous,
the economy is open rather than closed, and agents live in overlapping genera-
tions rather than forever. (With this last assumption, the result holds under
stricter conditions than with the others.)
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Corporate proﬁts. Capital gains. Dividend and interest in-
come. These are just a few of the types of capital income
that are taxed in the United States—and, some would
say, taxed heavily. This situation is quite different from
what recent economic theory says is the optimal way to
tax capital income: Not at all.
The optimality of a zero capital income tax was ﬁrst
established by Chamley (1986).
1 His result contradicts
the conventional view in the public ﬁnance literature that
capital income should be taxed heavily. The convention-
al view is based on a model in which the saving rate is
assumed to be a ﬁxed fraction of income. In that model,
therefore, capital income taxes do not distort economic
decisions and, hence, are desirable. More recent econom-
ic theory uses models in which the saving rate is not
ﬁxed, but is rather chosen by consumers, to maximize
their utility from consumption over time. Using such a
model, Chamley shows that in the steady state, the opti-
mal tax rate on capital income is zero. This makes sense
if you realize that a constant tax rate on capital income is
equivalent to an ever-increasing tax rate on consumption.
Under a wide variety of assumptions, such a tax on con-
sumption cannot be optimal.
Chamley’s (1986) result has not been universally
accepted because it is based on a narrow set of assump-
tions: identical and inﬁnitely lived consumers, steady-
state growth not affected by taxes, and a closed econo-
my. Here we lay out a simple framework in which we
describe Chamley’s result and then relax his assump-
tions, one by one, to see if the zero capital income tax
result still holds. It does.
That result is not exactly new. Several other research-
ers have independently extended Chamley’s (1986) study
in various ways and gotten a similar result for the parts
they examined, using various types of models and ap-
proaches. (See Judd 1985, Razin and Sadka 1995, and
Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi 1997.)
What is new here is our attempt to unify that work.
We relax all Chamley’s assumptions in just one type of
model—a discrete time model—using just one ap-
proach—the primal approach. In the primal approach,
the consumer and ﬁrm ﬁrst-order conditions are used to
eliminate prices and tax rates, and the problem of deter-
mining optimal policy reduces to a simple programming
problem in which the choice variables are the allocations.
We refer to this programming problem as the Ramsey
problem and to the associated allocations and policies as
the Ramsey allocations and the Ramsey plan. Our uniﬁ-
cation of the work on Chamley’s result allows a reliable
comparison of the results for the various assumptions.
Note that our work does not lead to quite as drastic a
policy recommendation as it may seem to. We do not
conclude that capital income taxes should simply be set
to zero immediately.
The basic Chamley result is that in a steady state, the
optimal capital income tax rate is zero. In practice, we
think that this should be interpreted as saying that over
the long term, capital income tax rates should be driven
to zero. However, with slightly stronger assumptions, the
basic Chamley result can be extended to say that it is op-
timal to have an initial phase of positive capital income
tax rates that is soon followed by a tax rate of zero. In
practice, even if policymakers decide to move to a sys-
tem of zero capital income taxes, it will take a while to
actually implement the new rules. Perhaps this imple-
mentation lag corresponds roughly to the initial phase of
positive capital income taxes in the model. If so, the best
way to implement the Chamley result is to start the pro-
cess of dispensing with capital income taxes right away.
Our study, of course, has its own assumptions, which
some might see as limitations. Primarily, we assume
that the government can commit to follow a long-term
program for taxing capital income. Without a technolo-
gy to make such a commitment, there are time inconsis-
tency problems; equilibrium outcomes with government
commitment are not necessarily sustainable without it.
2
The U.S. government has not yet made such an explicit
commitment to follow its announced policies. But cer-
tainly it does have considerable constitutional and other
legal means to do so. Therefore, we do not think that
our government commitment assumption should blunt
our bottom-line message to U.S. policymakers. Those
responsible for shaping the best possible tax system for
the nation would be wise to give serious attention to the
relatively new principle of public ﬁnance demonstrated
here: taxing capital income is a bad idea.
The Economy
We start by setting up an economy in which to analyze
Chamley’s zero capital income tax result.
The framework we use combines two traditions in
economics: the public ﬁnance tradition and the general
equilibrium tradition. The public ﬁnance tradition we fol-
low stems from the work of Ramsey (1927), who con-
siders the problem of choosing an optimal tax structure in
an economy with a representative agent when only dis-
torting taxes are available. The general equilibrium tradi-
tion we follow models growth as arising from consum-
ers’ optimal choices of consumption and investment.
This tradition stems from the work of Cass (1965), Koop-
mans (1965), Kydland and Prescott (1982), and Lucas
and Stokey (1983).
Consider a production economy populated by a large
number of identical, inﬁnitely lived consumers. In each
period of time t = 0, 1, ..., the economy has two goods: a
consumption-capital good and labor. A constant returns
to scale technology which satisﬁes the standard Inada
conditions is available to transform capital kt and labor lt
into output via the production function F(kt,lt). The out-
put can be used for private consumption ct, government
consumption gt, and new capital kt+1. Government con-
sumption is exogenously speciﬁed and constant, so gt=g.
In such an economy, feasibility requires that the re-
source constraint be satisﬁed:
(1) ct + g + kt+1 = F(kt,lt) + (1−d)kt
where d is the depreciation rate on capital. The prefer-





where the discount factor 0 < b < 1 and utility U is strict-
ly increasing in consumption, is strictly decreasing in la-
bor, is strictly concave, and satisﬁes the standard Inada
conditions.In this economy, consumers own capital and rent it
to ﬁrms. Government consumption is ﬁnanced by pro-
portional taxes on the income from capital and labor.
Let qt and tt denote the tax rates on the income from







(4) Rkt =1+( 1 − qt)(rt−d)
is the gross return on capital after taxes and deprecia-
tion, rt and wt are the before-tax returns on capital and
labor, pt is the price of consumption in period t, p0 is
normalized to 1, and the initial capital stock k0 is given.





(7) pt = Rkt+1pt+1
where l is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer’s
budget constraint. Here Uct and Ult are the partial deriv-
atives of U(ct,lt) with respect to ct and lt. (We use simi-
lar notation throughout our analysis.)
Firms in this economy maximize proﬁts:
(8) max F(kt,lt)−wtlt − rtkt.
The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions imply that before-tax re-
turns on capital and labor equal their marginal products,
namely, that
(9) rt = Fk(kt,lt)
(10) wt = Fl(kt,lt).
The government sets tax rates on capital and labor in-
come to ﬁnance the exogenous sequence of government






Let pt =( tt,qt) denote the government policy at t, and
let p denote the policies for all t. Let xt =( ct,lt,kt+1) de-
note an allocation for consumers at t, and let x denote
an allocation for all t. Let (w,r,p) denote a price system
for all t.
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a pol-
icy p, an allocation x, and a price system (w,r,p) such
that given the policy and the price system, the resulting
allocation maximizes the representative consumer’s util-
ity, expression (2), subject to the consumer’s budget con-
straint, (3); the price system satisﬁes equations (9) and
(10); and both the government’s budget constraint (11)
and the economy’s resource constraint (1) are satisﬁed.
Consider now the policy problem faced by the gov-
ernment. Suppose that in the economy an institution, or
commitment technology, exists through which the gov-
ernment, in period 0, can bind itself to a particular se-
quence of policies once and for all. We model this by
having the government choose a policy p at the begin-
ning of time, after which consumers choose their alloca-
tions. Formally, allocation rules are sequences of func-
tions x(p)=(xt(p)) that map policies p into allocations
x(p). Price rules are sequences of functions w(p)=
(wt(p)), r(p)=(rt(p)), and p(p)=(pt(p)) that map poli-
cies p into price systems.
Since the government needs to predict how consumer
allocations and prices will respond to its policies, con-
sumer allocations and prices must be described by rules
that associate government policies with allocations. We
impose two restrictions on the set of policies that the
government can choose. The government must choose
policies for which a competitive equilibrium exists;
hence, the allocation rules are deﬁned only over such
policies. Also, since the capital stock in period 0 is in-
elastically supplied, the government has an incentive to
set the initial capital tax rate as high as possible. To
make the problem interesting, we require that the initial
capital income tax rate, q0, be ﬁxed.
A Ramsey equilibrium in this economy is a policy p,
an allocation rule x(), and price rules w() and r() that
satisfy these two conditions:





subject to the government’s budget constraint (11),
with allocations and prices given by x(p), w(p), and
r(p).
• For every p¢, the allocation x(p¢); the price system
w(p¢), r(p¢), and p(p¢); and the policy p¢ constitute a
competitive equilibrium.
If multiple competitive equilibria are associated with
some policies, our deﬁnition of a Ramsey equilibrium re-
quires that a selection be made from the set of competi-
tive equilibria. We focus on the Ramsey equilibrium that
yields the highest utility.
Now consider the equilibrium allocations and poli-
cies in this economy. For convenience in terms of nota-
tion, let Uct and Ult denote the marginal utilities of con-
sumption and leisure in period t, and let Fkt and Flt
denote the marginal products of capital and labor in
period t. A competitive equilibrium allocation is char-
acterized by two fairly simple conditions: the resource






(14) Rk0 =1+( 1 − q0)(Fk0−d).
To see that the competitive equilibrium allocations
satisfy (13), observe that this implementability constraint
is the consumer’s budget constraint with the prices and
policies substituted out by the consumer and ﬁrm ﬁrst-
order conditions.
To see that any allocation which satisﬁes (1) and (13)
is a competitive equilibrium allocation, use these alloca-
tions together with the ﬁrst-order conditions of the con-
sumer and the ﬁrm to construct the corresponding equi-
librium prices and policies. The prices rt and wt aredetermined by (9) and (10). From (5), the price pt is
given by
(15) pt = b
tUct/Uc0.
The labor income tax rate tt is determined from (5), (6),
and (10) and is given by
(16) −Ult/Uct = (1−tt)Flt.
The capital income tax rate qt+1 for t ³ 0 is determined
from (5), (7), and (9) and is implicitly deﬁned by
(17) Uct = bUct+1Rkt+1
where
(18) Rkt+1 =1+( 1 − qt+1)(Fkt+1−d)
and the capital income tax rate q0 is given.
From our characterization of a competitive equilibri-
um, we can see immediately that the allocations in a
Ramsey equilibrium solve the Ramsey allocation prob-
lem of maximizing consumers’ utility (2) subject to the
constraints (1) and (13). For convenience, write the Ram-





subject to (1). The function W simply incorporates the
implementability constraint into the maximand and is
given by
(20) W(ct,lt,l)=U(ct,lt)+l(Uctct + Ultlt)
where l is the Lagrange multiplier on the implement-
ability constraint, (13). The ﬁrst-order conditions for this
problem imply that, for t ³ 1,
(21) −Wlt/Wct = Flt
and, for t = 1, 2, ...,
(22) Wct = bWct+1(1−d+Fkt+1)
while
(23) Wc0 = bWc1(1−d+Fk1)+lUcc0Rk0k0.
In the following results, we will repeatedly use the
observation that if the term
(24) Wct/Uct =1+l{[(Ucctct + Ucltlt)/Uct]+1 }
has the same value in periods t and t + 1, then the capi-
tal income tax in period t + 1 is zero. To see this, note
that if
(25) Wct/Uct = Wct+1/Uct+1
then (22) can be written as
(26) Uct = bUct+1(1−d+Fkt+1)
which from (17) implies that the capital income tax rate
qt+1 = 0. Notice from (23) that the ﬁrst-order condition
for consumption in period 0 includes extra terms. Thus,
even if
(27) Wc0/Uc0 = Wc1/Uc1
the capital income tax in period 1 is not necessarily
equal to zero.
We label the term in (24) the general equilibrium ex-
penditure elasticity. This elasticity captures the distor-
tions relevant for setting taxes on capital income in gen-
eral equilibrium. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) show that
for special forms of utility, an elasticity similar to this
one reduces to either the price elasticity or the income
elasticity of demand.
Throughout, we assume that the solution to the Ram-
sey problem occurs at an interior point. Note that since
the set of allocations which satisfy the implementability
constraint is not necessarily convex, the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions for the Ramsey problem are necessary but not
sufficient. (For a discussion of nonconvexity, see Lucas
and Stokey 1983.)
Chamley’s Result
Chamley (1986) shows, for a model economy similar to
the one just described, that the optimal capital income
tax is zero in a steady state. Here we demonstrate that
result in our model. Then we restrict attention to a com-
monly used class of utility functions and analyze opti-
mal capital income taxes in the transition to the steady
state as well. The result: With no upper bound on capi-
tal income taxation, capital income taxes are zero start-
ing in period 2. And with an upper bound, capital in-
come taxes are zero after a ﬁnite number of periods.
To establish Chamley’s result in a steady state, sup-
pose that under the Ramsey plan, the allocations con-
verge to a steady state. In our model in such a steady
state, Wc and Uc are constant; hence, the general equi-
librium expenditure elasticity is constant. Thus, (22) re-
duces to (26), and steady-state capital income taxes are
zero. In sum:
PROPOSITION 1. If the solution to the Ramsey problem
converges to a steady state, then in the steady state, the
tax rate on capital income is zero.
(Note that here—and in the following steady-state re-
sults—we prove that if there exists a steady state of the
type considered, then the optimal capital income taxes
are zero. We do not prove that the solution to the Ram-
sey problem necessarily converges to the type of steady
state considered. Proving this stronger result may require
additional assumptions.)
One way to get intuition for Proposition 1 is to note
that taxing capital income in period t + 1 is equivalent to
taxing consumption at a higher rate in period t + 1 than
in period t. Thus, a positive tax on capital income in a
steady state is equivalent to an ever-increasing tax on
consumption. Such an increasing tax cannot be optimal
in a steady state because all of the relevant general equi-
librium expenditure elasticities are constant over time.
For certain utility functions, we can establish a much
stronger result, namely, that optimal capital income taxes
are zero after only a few periods. (See Chamley 1986,for a related analysis in continuous time.) Here we show
that for a commonly used class of utility functions, dis-
torting the capital accumulation decision in period 1 or
thereafter is not optimal.








where s£1a n d0<g < 1. These utility functions are
commonly used in the literature on economic growth
because they are consistent with the type of balanced
growth observed in the U.S. economy. (Note that in
(28), balanced growth occurs only if s = 1.) For any
utility function of the form (28) or (29), we can easily
show that for all periods t ³ 1,
(30) Wct+1/Wct = Uct+1/Uct.
Thus, for all periods t ³ 1, (22) reduces to (26); hence,
the optimal capital income taxes are zero for all periods
t ³ 2. In sum:
PROPOSITION 2. For utility functions of the form (28) or
(29), it is not optimal to distort the capital accumulation
decision in period 1 or thereafter. Therefore, the optimal
tax rate on capital income received in period t is zero for
t ³ 2.
Note that under the Ramsey plan, the government op-
timally distorts only the ﬁrst decision to accumulate cap-
ital, which occurs in period 1. The government distorts
that decision by levying a positive capital income tax in
period 2 on the resulting income. In period 0, of course,
the tax rate is ﬁxed by assumption. Intuitively, we can
see that for utility functions of the form considered here,
the general equilibrium expenditure elasticity is constant
even out of steady state, so that except for period 1, the
capital income tax should always be zero. This result is
much stronger than the standard Chamley result, which
refers to steady states.
In a continuous time version of the model with in-
stantaneous preferences given by (28), Chamley (1986)
shows that the tax rate on capital income is constant for
a ﬁnite length of time and is zero thereafter. The reason
for Chamley’s different result is that he imposes an ex-
ogenous upper bound on the tax rate on capital income.
We now impose such an upper bound and prove a dis-
crete time analog of Chamley’s result.
In particular, we assume that agents have the option
to hold their capital without renting it to ﬁrms at a rate
of return 1 − d. Under this assumption, the after-tax rate
of return on capital is bounded below in equilibrium by
1−d. The Ramsey equilibrium in this case, in addition
to satisfying the analogs of (1) and (13) (the resource
and implementability constraints), must satisfy an extra
condition derived from (17) to be part of a competitive
equilibrium:
(31) Uct ³b Uct+1(1−d).
Considering the Ramsey problem with (31) as an ad-
ditional constraint, we have
PROPOSITION 3. Under an optimal policy, for utility func-
tions of the form (28) and (29) and with a production
function in which F(0,l)=0 ,the constraint (31) on the
capital income tax rate is binding for a ﬁnite number of
periods. After that, the tax takes on an intermediate value
for one period and is zero thereafter.
Proof. We prove this proposition by establishing three
claims. First, we claim that the constraint (31) cannot be
slack in some period t, bind in periods later than t, and
then be slack in some period t + n. Second, we claim
that the constraint (31) cannot bind in every period.
These two arguments together imply that the constraint
(31) holds for at most some ﬁnite number of periods
initially and then does not bind again. Finally, we claim
that if t is the last period in which the constraint (31)
binds, then the optimal capital income tax is zero in all
periods s with s ³ t + 2. (In period t + 1, the capital in-
come tax may be at some intermediate value.)
Let b
tft be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
(31) and b
tgt be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource
constraint (1). Then the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Ram-
sey problem are, with respect to capital,
(32) gt = bgt+1[(1−d)+Fkt+1]
and with respect to consumption,
(33) gt = Wct +[ ft − (1−d)ft−1]Ucct.
With utility of the form (28) or (29),
(34) Wct/Wct+1 = Uct/Uct+1.
To prove our ﬁrst claim, suppose by way of contra-
diction that in two periods, t and t + n, ft = ft+n = 0 and
ft+1, ft+2, ..., ft+n−1 are all greater than zero. Equations
(32) and (33) imply that




Equation (34), together with the assumption that con-
straint (31) is binding in periods t +1 ,t + 2, ..., t + n −
1, implies that
(36) Wct+1 = b
n−1(1−d)
n−1Wct+n.
Plugging this into (35) then gives
(37) ft+1Ucct+1 ³ −b
n−1(1−d)
n−1(1−d)ft+n−1Ucct+n
which is a contradiction since Ucc <0 .
To prove the second claim, note that if the constraint
(31) binds in every period, then the capital stock rented
to ﬁrms goes to zero at a rate determined by
(38) kt+1 = (1−d)ktand given the assumption F(0,l) = 0, the resource con-
straint (1) is violated. Thus, the constraint (31) cannot
bind in every period.
To prove the third claim, observe that if t is the last
period in which the constraint (31) binds, then (32)–(34)
imply that
(39) Ucs = bUcs+1[(1−d)+Fks+1]
for periods s ³ t + 2, which implies that the capital in-
come tax is zero. Q.E.D.
Extending Chamley’s Result
Now we examine whether the zero capital income tax re-
sult extends to other economic environments. We con-
sider an economy which has agents not identical, but
rather heterogeneous; an economy which grows at a rate
determined not exogenously, but rather endogenously; an
economy which is not closed, but open; and an economy
with agents not inﬁnitely lived, but rather born into over-
lapping generations. We ﬁnd that Chamley’s basic result
extends to all of these environments. The overlapping-
generations economy alone requires somewhat stricter
conditions for a zero capital income tax to be optimal.
3
Heterogeneous Consumers
We begin by switching from identical to heterogeneous
agents. We examine the natural conjecture that, with
more than one type of consumer, a nonzero tax on capital
income is optimal to redistribute income from one type to
another. We study ﬁrst an environment in which the dif-
ferent types of consumers can be taxed at different rates
and then environments in which all consumers have to be
taxed at the same rate. We ﬁnd, with some caveats, that
with heterogeneous agents, taxing capital income in a
steady state is not optimal.
Assume our economy now has two types of consum-






where cit and lit denote the consumption and the labor
supply of a consumer of type i. Assume that the dis-
count factors are the same for both types of consumers.
The resource constraint for this economy is then given
by
(41) c1t + c2t + g + kt+1 = F(kt,l1t,l2t) + (1−d)kt
where the production function F has constant returns to
scale.
Notice that the production function allows for imper-
fect substitutability between the two types of capital and
labor. For this economy, the implementability constraints















0 denotes the initial ownership of capital by con-





0. If the tax system allows tax rates on capital income
and labor income to differ across consumer types, then
it is straightforward to establish that the resource con-
straint (41) and the two implementability constraints (42)
completely characterize a competitive equilibrium.
For a Ramsey equilibrium, suppose that the govern-











where the welfare weights wi Î [0,1] satisfy w1 + w2 =1 .
The Ramsey problem is to maximize (43) subject to the










for t ³ 0. Here li is the Lagrange multiplier on the im-
plementability constraint for the consumer of type i. The










subject to the resource constraint (41). The ﬁrst-order
conditions for capital for this problem imply that for i =
1, 2 and for t = 1, 2, ...,
(46) Wcit = bWcit+1(1−d+Fkt+1).
Here the general equilibrium expenditure elasticity for
the consumer of type i is
(47) Wcit/U
i







In a steady state, Wcit/U
i
ct is constant over time for i =1 ,
2, so the steady-state tax on capital income is zero for
both types of consumers. Notice that this result is true
regardless of the weights wi the government places on
the two types of consumers. In sum:
PROPOSITION 4. In an economy with heterogeneous con-
sumers, the steady-state tax rate on capital income is
zero for all consumers, regardless of the government’s
welfare weights wi. Furthermore, if utility is of the form
(28) or (29), then the optimal capital income tax is zero
in periods t ³ 2 as well.
Judd (1985) shows that this result holds when type 1
consumers are workers who supply labor, cannot save
or borrow, and hold no initial capital, while type 2 con-
sumers are capitalists who own all the capital but supply







for all t. With this constraint, in the solution to the Ram-
sey problem, (46) for the capitalists continues to hold;
thus, the steady-state tax on capital income is zero. This
result shows that even if the government puts zero
weight on the capitalists, taxing capital in the long run is
not optimal.
Now suppose that the tax system does not allow tax
rates on either capital income or labor income to differ
across consumer types. These restrictions on the tax sys-tem imply extra constraints on the allocations that can
be achieved in a competitive equilibrium.
Consider ﬁrst the restriction that tax rates on capital
income do not differ across consumers. To derive the
restrictions that this adds to the Ramsey problem, con-
sider the consumers’ intertemporal ﬁrst-order conditions,





ct+1 = b[1 + (1−qt+1)(Fkt+1−d)].











holds in any competitive equilibrium. Thus, (50) is an
extra restriction that must be added to the Ramsey prob-
lem. Note that (46) is still the ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to capital of the Ramsey problem with the addi-
tional constraint (50). Thus, we conclude that the steady-
state tax on capital income is zero.
Consider next the restriction that tax rates on labor
income do not differ across consumers. The consumers’

















holds in any competitive equilibrium and thus must be
added to the Ramsey problem. Note that this additional
constraint does, in general, depend on the level of capi-
tal k if and only if the ratio Fl1t/Fl2t depends on k. Re-
call that the production function is separable between k
and (l1,l2)i fFl1t/Fl2t does not depend on k. Such separa-
ble production functions can be written in the form
(53) F(k,l1,l2)=F(k,H(l1,l2))
for some function H. In this case, it is straightforward to
show, again, that the steady-state tax on capital income
is zero. (For some related discussion, see Stiglitz 1987.)
The discussion of the extra constraints on the Ramsey
problem implied by restrictions on the tax system sug-
gests this observation: Zero capital income taxation in
the steady state is optimal if the extra constraints do not
depend on the capital stock and is not optimal if these
constraints depend on the capital stock (and, of course,
are binding).
Endogenous Growth
Now we return to a version of Chamley’s original mod-
el, but relax his exogenously determined growth as-
sumption. We consider a model in which the long-run
growth rate of the economy is not simply given, but
rather is determined by agents’ decisions to accumulate
both physical and human capital. Analysis of optimal
policy in this endogenous growth model leads to a re-
markable result: Along a balanced growth path, all taxes
are zero.
Our discussion is restricted to a version of the model
with both physical and human capital described by
Lucas (1990). In this model, the long-run growth rate is
endogenously determined by agents’ decisions to accu-
mulate these two forms of capital. (Bull 1992 and Jones,
Manuelli, and Rossi 1997 discuss extensions of the result
that the optimal capital income tax is zero to a larger
class of endogenous growth models.)
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon model in which the tech-
nology for producing goods is given by a constant re-
turns to scale production function F(kt,htl1t), where kt de-
notes the physical capital stock in period t, ht denotes the
human capital stock in period t, and l1t denotes labor
input to goods production in period t. Human capital in-
vestment in period t is given by htG(l2t), where l2t de-
notes labor input into human capital accumulation and G
is an increasing concave function. The resource con-
straints for this economy are
(54) ct + g + kt+1 = F(kt,htl1t) + (1−dk)kt
(55) ht+1 = htG(l2t) + (1−dh)ht
where ct is private consumption, g is exogenously given
government consumption, and dk and dh are depreciation
rates on physical and human capital, respectively.








where v is a decreasing convex function. Government
consumption is ﬁnanced by proportional taxes on the in-
come from capital and labor in the goods production
sector. Let qt and tt again denote the tax rates on the in-








(58) Rkt =1+( 1 − qt)(rt−d)
is the gross return on capital after taxes and depreciation
and rt and wt are, again, the before-tax returns on capital
and labor. Note that human capital accumulation is a
nonmarket activity.
The consumer’s problem in this economy is to choose
sequences of consumption, labor, and physical and hu-
man capital to maximize utility subject to (55) and (57).
The ﬁrms maximize these proﬁts:
(59) Fk(kt,htl1t)−rtkt − wthtl1t.






Along a balanced growth path for this economy, l1 and
l2 are constant, and consumption, output, and both types
of capital all grow at rate G(l2)+1−d.
To develop the implementability constraints on the
Ramsey problem for this economy, we use the consum-







(62) A0 = Uc0[1 + (1−q0)(Fk0−d)]k0
− Ul0(l10 + {[1 − dh + G(l20)]/G¢(l20)})
and
(63) Ult/htG¢(l2t)
={ [ bUlt+1/ht+1G¢(l2t+1)][1 − dh + G(l2t+1)]}
+( bUlt+1l1t+1/ht+1).
The ﬁrst of these constraints (61) is the consumer’s
budget constraint, and the second (63) is the ﬁrst-order
condition governing the consumer’s human capital accu-
mulation. Constraint (63) is required because human cap-
ital accumulation occurs outside the market and cannot
be taxed. Thus, in any competitive equilibrium, the Euler
equation for human capital accumulation is undistorted.
Therefore, no tax instrument can be used to make the
Euler equation for human capital accumulation hold for
arbitrary allocations. In contrast, for arbitrary allocations,
the Euler equation for physical capital can be made to
hold by choosing the tax on capital income appropriately.
This incompleteness of the tax system implies that the
undistorted Euler equation for human capital accumula-
tion is a constraint on the set of competitive allocations.
The economy’s implementability constraints (61) and
(63) together with its resource constraints (54) and (55)
characterize competitive equilibrium allocations. The cor-
responding Ramsey problem for this economy is to maxi-
mize utility (56) subject to these constraints.
We prove that along a balanced growth path, the ﬁrst-
order conditions for the Ramsey problem are the same as
those for a government which has access to lump-sum
taxes. (This, of course, does not mean that the govern-
ment can achieve the lump-sum tax allocation; there are
distortions along the equilibrium path.) Let
(64) W(ct,l1t+l2t;l)=U(ct,l1t+l2t)+lctUct
where l is the Lagrange multiplier on (61). For our speci-
ﬁed utility function,
(65) W(ct,l1t+l2t;l)=[ 1+l(1−s)]U(ct,l1t+l2t).
The Ramsey problem, then, is to maximize
(66) b
tW(ct,l1t+l2t;l)−lA0
subject to (54), (55), and (63).
Consider a relaxed problem in which we drop (63).
Since in this rewritten problem the objective function
from period 1 onward is proportional to that of a gov-
ernment which has access to lump-sum taxes, the solu-
tions to the two problems are the same along a balanced
growth path. Along such a path, this solution also satis-
ﬁes (63). Thus, along a balanced growth path, the Ram-
sey problem has the same solution as the lump-sum tax
problem. However, the solutions to these last two prob-
lems differ along the transition paths. In sum:
PROPOSITION 5. In our endogenous growth model, if the
Ramsey allocation converges to a balanced growth path,
then along such a path, all taxes are zero.
(Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) prove a similar result
for a more general economy.)
One might be concerned that this result depends on
the ratio of government consumption to output going to
zero. Concern about that is not warranted. Consider an
extension of the model described above, one with an
environment in which the government chooses the path
of government consumption optimally. Suppose that the
period utility function is given by U(c1,l1+l2)+V(g),
where V is some increasing function of government con-
sumption. The government problem in this setup is to
choose both tax rates and government consumption to
maximize the consumer’s utility.
We can solve this problem in two parts. In the ﬁrst
part, government consumption is taken as exogenous
and tax rates are chosen optimally. In the second part,
government consumption is chosen optimally. The proof
described above obviously goes through for extensions
of this kind. For
(67) V(g)=ag
1−s/(1−s)
it is easy to show that along a balanced growth path,
government consumption is a constant fraction of out-
put.
An Open Economy
Now we consider the optimal capital income tax in a
small open-economy model. In so doing, we abstract
from the strategic issues that arise when more than one
authority sets taxes and from the general equilibrium
linkages between an economy’s ﬁscal policy and world
prices. We determine that Chamley’s zero capital income
tax result holds even in an open economy.
When an economy is open, besides taxing its citizens,
a government can tax foreign owners of factors that are
located in its country. To allow this possibility in our
model, we allow the government to use two types of
taxes. Source-based taxes are taxes that governments
levy on income generated in their country at the income’s
source, regardless of the income’s ownership. Residence-
based taxes are taxes that governments levy on the in-
come of their country’s residents regardless of the in-
come’s source. We show that the optimal source-based
taxes on capital income are zero in all periods and that
the optimal residence-based taxes are too, at least when
the economy has a steady state. This result is much
stronger than the corresponding results for closed econo-
mies. (See Razin and Sadka 1995 for some closely re-
lated work.)
So, consider an open-economy model with both
source-based and residence-based taxation. We model
source-based taxes as those levied on a ﬁrm and resi-
dence-based taxes as those levied on consumers.
Let r
*
t be the world rental rate on capital income when
the world has no domestically levied taxes. A ﬁrm’s prob-
lem is to(68) max F(kt,lt) − (1+qft)r
*
tkt − (1+tft)wtlt
where qft and tft are the source-based tax rates on in-




t = Fkt − r
*
t
(70) tftwt = Flt − wt.











where pt = Õ
t
s=1(1/Rs), Rs =1+( 1 − qcs)(r
*
s−d), p0 =1 ,qct
and tct are residence-based taxes on the income from
capital and labor, and initial assets are set to zero for
convenience. The consumer ﬁrst-order conditions are
(73) −Ult/Uct = wt(1−tct)
(74) bUct+1/Uct =1 / Rt+1.
In the closed-economy models we have studied, the
competitive equilibrium has consumer budget constraints,
a government budget constraint, and a resource con-
straint. In this small open economy, there is no resource
constraint, and the government budget constraint can be
replaced by the economywide budget constraint (which is




t=0qt[ct + g + kt+1 − (1−d)kt]=
¥
t=0qtF(kt,lt)








s +1−d. Notice that
the economy as a whole borrows and lends at the before-
tax rate R
*
s, while consumers borrow and lend at the
after-tax rate Rs. In this economy, any taxes on borrow-
ing or lending levied on consumers are receipts of the
government and cancel out in the combined budget con-
straint.
To derive the constraints for the Ramsey problem in
an open economy with both types of taxes available,
ﬁrst substitute the consumer ﬁrst-order conditions into





where we have used the fact that (74) implies that pt =
b
tUct/Uc0. Next notice that the ﬁrst-order conditions of
the ﬁrm and the consumer can be summarized by (69),
(74), and
(77) −Ult/Uct = Flt(1−tct)/(1+tft).
Thus, for each marginal condition, there is at least one
tax rate, and the Ramsey problem has no additional
constraints. With both source- and residence-based taxes
available, therefore, the Ramsey problem is to maximize
(71) subject to (75) and (76).
With either purely source-based taxation or purely
residence-based taxation, the Ramsey problem does have
additional constraints. With purely source-based taxa-
tion, tct = qct = 0 for all t, so Rt = R
*
t for all t. For such a
tax system, therefore, (74) implies that the Ramsey prob-
lem has this additional constraint:
(78) bUct+1/Uct =1 / R
*
t+1.
With purely residence-based taxation, tft = qft =0 ,s o
(69) implies that the Ramsey problem has this additional
constraint:
(79) Fkt = r
*
t.
With both source- and residence-based taxes avail-





subject to (75). Here
(81) W(ct,lt,l)=U(ct,lt)+l(Uctct + Ultlt).
The ﬁrst-order condition for capital then implies that
(82) Fkt = r
*
t
while the ﬁrst-order condition for consumption implies
that
(83) bWct+1/Wct =1 / R
*
t+1.
Condition (82) implies that setting qft = 0 for all t is
optimal. We know that this small economy will have a




for all t. Under this parameter restriction, (83) implies
that Wct = Wct+1; thus, the Ramsey allocations are con-
stant. In particular, Uct = Uct+1. Hence, equations (74)
and (84) imply that qct = 0 for all t.
Under a system with only source-based taxes, the
Ramsey problem is to maximize (80) subject to (75) and
(83). For a relaxed version of this problem, with con-
straint (83) dropped, the above analysis makes clear that
the solution satisﬁes the dropped constraint and hence
solves the original problem. The ﬁrst-order condition for
capital then implies (82); hence, qft = 0 for all t.
Similarly, under a system with only residence-based
taxes, the Ramsey problem is to maximize (80) subject
to (75) and (79). For a relaxed version of this problem,
with constraint (79) dropped, the above analysis makes
clear that the solution satisﬁes the dropped constraint
and hence solves the original problem. The ﬁrst-order
condition for consumption in the relaxed problem is
(83). Under the parameter restriction (84), Wct = Wct+1,
so Uct = Uct+1. Hence, equations (74) and (84) imply
that qct = 0 for all t.
In sum:
PROPOSITION 6. In our open-economy model, either un-
der a system with both source- and residence-basedtaxes or under a system with only source-based taxes,
qft =0for all t. Also, in this model, with the additional
restriction (84), either under a system with both source-
and residence-based taxes or under a system with only
residence-based taxes, qct =0for all t.
Notice that the Ramsey allocations from the problem
with both source- and residence-based taxes can be
achieved with residence-based taxes alone. With the ad-
ditional restriction (84), these allocations can also be
achieved with source-based taxes alone. The intuition for
why optimal source-based taxes are zero is that with
capital mobility, each government faces a perfectly elas-
tic supply of capital as a factor input and therefore op-
timally chooses to set capital income taxes on ﬁrms to
zero. The intuition for why optimal residence-based taxes
are zero is that under restriction (84), the small economy
instantly jumps to a steady state, so the Chamley-type
logic applies for all t.
Overlapping Generations
Finally, we consider optimal capital income taxes in a
closed economy with overlapping generations rather than
inﬁnitely lived agents.
4 We show that in this type of
economy, tax rates on capital income in a steady state
are optimally zero if certain homotheticity and separabil-
ity conditions are satisﬁed. This result has been indepen-
dently derived by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) and
Garriga (1999).
We brieﬂy formulate optimal ﬁscal policy in an over-
lapping-generations model. Consider a two-period over-
lapping-generations model with a constant population
normalized to 1. The resource constraint for this econo-
my is
(85) c1t + c2t + kt+1 + g = F(kt,l1t,l2t) + (1−d)kt
where c1t and c2t denote the consumption of a represen-
tative young agent and a representative old agent in pe-
riod t, l1t and l2t denote the corresponding labor inputs,
kt denotes the capital stock in t, d denotes the deprecia-
tion rate on capital, and g denotes government consump-
tion. Each young agent in t solves the problem to
(86) max U(c1t,l1t)+bU(c2t+1,l2t+1)
subject to
(87) c1t + kt+1 + bt+1 = (1−t1t)w1tl1t
(88) c2t+1 = (1−t2t+1)w2t+1l2t+1
+[ 1+( 1 − qt+1)(rt+1 − d)]kt+1 + Rt+1bt+1
where t1t and t2t are the tax rates on the two types of
labor inputs, qt is the tax rate on capital income, bt+1 is
the government debt held by the young generation at t,
and Rt again is the return on capital. The government
budget constraint in this economy is
(89) t1tw1tl1t + t2tw2tl2t + qtrtkt + bt+1 = g + Rtbt.
To deﬁne an optimal policy here, we must assign
weights to the utility of agents in each generation. We
assume that the government assigns weight l
t to genera-







subject to the resource constraint for each t and the im-
plementability constraint
(91) R(c1t,l1t)+bR(c2t+1,l2t+1)=0
for each t, where
(92) R(c,l) º cUc(c,l)+lUl(c,l)
and U(c20,l20) is the utility of the initial old. Constraint
(91) is the implementability constraint associated with
each generation except the initial old. (The implement-
ability constraint for the initial old plays no role in our
steady-state analysis.) It is straightforward to show that
if the solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a
steady state with constant allocations
(93) (c1t,l1t,c2t+1,l2t+1,kt+1)=( c1,l1,c2,l2,k)
then the Ramsey allocations satisfy
(94) l
−1 = Fk +1−d.
In a steady state in this economy, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion for capital accumulation is
(95) Uc(c1,l1)/bUc(c2,l2)=1+( 1 − q)(Fk−d).
These equations imply that unless
(96) l
−1 = Uc(c1,l1)/bUc(c2,l2)
the tax rate on capital income is not zero in this econo-
my. In general, we would not expect condition (96) to
hold. Notice the contrast with inﬁnitely lived represen-
tative-consumer models in which, in a steady state, the
marginal utility of the representative consumer Uc(ct,lt)
is constant. In an overlapping-generations model, we
would not expect the marginal utility of a consumer to
be constant over the consumer’s lifetime.
In our overlapping-generations model, the ﬁrst-order
conditions for consumption in the Ramsey problem, eval-
uated at the steady-state allocations, are
(97) Uc1 + atRc1 =µ t
(98) b(Uc2 + atRc2)=lµt
where l
tat is the Lagrange multiplier on the implement-
ability constraint (91) for the generation born in period t
and l
tµt is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource con-
straint (85) in period t. With a utility function of the form
(28), Rc is proportional to Uc, so that (97) and (98) imply
(96). In sum:
PROPOSITION 7. In our overlapping-generations econo-
my, if the utility function is of the form (28), then in a
steady state, the optimal tax on capital income is zero.When l = b and F(k,l1,l2)=F(k,l1+l2), we can show
that for all strictly concave utility functions, the optimal
tax on capital income is zero in a steady state. (See
Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe 1999.)
Theory vs. Practice
By formally describing and extending Chamley’s (1986)
result, we have demonstrated how the primal approach
can be used to answer a fundamental question in public
ﬁnance: What is the optimal capital income tax? This
approach has produced a substantive lesson for policy-
makers: In the long run, in a broad class of environ-
ments, the optimal tax on capital income is zero. With
further restrictions on our model, we have shown that
this result applies to the short run as well. Theoretically,
that is, our result concurs with that of Chamley (1986):
taxing capital income is a bad idea.
We think that this result should be applied in the real
world, and we see signs that some U.S. policymakers
agree. Currently, of course, U.S. capital income tax rates
are far from zero. That is understandable, since until rel-
atively recently, the dominant economic theory sup-
ported positive taxes on capital income; policymakers
were relying on what has become outdated theory. Re-
cently, however, practice seems to have shifted toward
the new theory’s result. During the Reagan administra-
tion, tax rates on dividends and capital gains began to
be lowered and tax exemptions for retirement savings
expanded. Recently, too, inﬂuential proponents of the
supply-side view, like Boskin (1978), Feldstein (1978),
Lucas (1990), and Hall and Rabushka (1995), have ad-
vocated lowering capital income taxes still further. Hall
and Rabushka (1995) have laid out a detailed proposal
on how to implement zero capital income taxation.5
Some researchers might disagree with this move-
ment. They might argue that the new theory is just too
simple to be applicable in the real world. The results of
our theory require what might seem to be unrealistic as-
sumptions, especially full commitment of the govern-
ment to keep to its announced tax policy and perfect
markets. Without such assumptions, the doubters might
say, this theory does not work.
They’re right, and they’re wrong. The assumptions are
necessary, to some extent, for the optimal capital income
tax to be zero. But the assumptions are not necessarily
unrealistic barriers that should block the theory’s practi-
cal application.
The highest perceived barrier is the difficulty in en-
suring that the government keep its promises. If the gov-
ernment cannot commit to follow some prespeciﬁed pol-
icies, then implementing the solution to the Ramsey
problem can be difficult. In any period, the government
has an incentive to renege on its past promises, tax the
income from existing capital highly, and promise that fu-
ture capital income will not be taxed. Kydland and Pres-
cott (1977) have shown that this tension could lead to
high capital income taxes in every period.
This barrier may be surmountable by one of two
means. First, as Chari and Kehoe (1990) have shown, a
desire to maintain a good reputation may give the gov-
ernment an incentive to keep its promises, at least if the
government is sufficiently patient. Second, if problems
with commitment are the reasons for high capital income
tax rates, the appropriate policy is to use available consti-
tutional and legal methods to commit to low rates. At an
extreme, if the U.S. legal system can guarantee free
speech, why can’t it guarantee that the government keep
its promises on tax policy?
Another perceived barrier is that in the real world,
private markets are not perfect, while in our theory, they
are. Doubters might argue that if we incorporate into the
theory imperfections, like externalities or missing mar-
kets, and still allow only income tax policies, then the
optimal capital income tax rate may not be zero. For
example, Aiyagari (1995) has argued that if the only in-
strument available to the government is income tax pol-
icies, then positive capital income tax rates are desirable
because they partially offset the distortions from missing
markets. Intuitively, Aiyagari’s argument relies on trying
to get one policy instrument to achieve two conﬂicting
goals: minimize tax distortions and partially replace the
missing markets.
We think this argument is weak. If there are imper-
fections in markets, the appropriate policy is to use some
direct policy instrument to deal with them. For example,
the appropriate direct policy in Aiyagari’s model is for
the government either to provide insurance or, even bet-
ter, to remove the unmodeled impediments to the private
provision of insurance. Once these direct means are used
to deal with the market imperfections, tax policy can be
left to do what it should be doing: minimizing tax distor-
tions by not taxing capital income.
1Judd (1985) proves a related result in an economy with different types of con-
sumers.
2Economies with government commitment technologies can be interpreted in at
least two ways. One is that the government can simply commit to its future actions
by, say, restrictions in its constitution. The other is that the government has no ac-
cess to such a commitment technology, but the commitment outcomes are sustained
by reputational mechanisms. For analyses of optimal policy in environments without
commitment, see, for example, Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott 1989; Chari and Kehoe
1990, 1993; and Stokey 1991.
3Throughout, we consider deterministic models. In a stochastic version of the
model with identical, inﬁnitely lived consumers, Zhu (1992) and Chari, Christiano,
and Kehoe (1994) show that while capital income taxes may be positive sometimes,
they are zero on average.
4The literature on optimal policy in overlapping-generations models includes, for
example, Atkinson 1971, Diamond 1973, Pestieau 1974, and Atkinson and Sandmo
1980; the surveys Auerbach 1985 and Stiglitz 1987; and the applied works Auerbach
and Kotlikoff 1987 and Escolano 1992. Of course, as Barro 1974 demonstrates, if be-
quests are allowed, then the overlapping-generations model is equivalent to a model
with inﬁnitely lived agents, and our earlier analysis applies.
5In addition to eliminating capital income taxation, Hall and Rabushka’s pro-
posal reduces the progressivity of the tax system. Our theory is silent on the optimal
progressivity of the tax system. Their proposal can be easily adapted to yield any
desired degree of progressivity.
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